The initial Planning for the operation had the division conducting a movement to contact of approximately 150 km, which would be followed by a hasty attack. Based on the results of the October FTX, the battalion plans section realized that the doctrinal approach would not meet the division requirements for an operation of this nature.
In order to meet the needs of the division, the communications plan needed to be flexible, able to extend over long distances, and survivable. After much discussion, the Battalion Commander, LTC Burse, approved a plan consisting of a modified "daisy chain". Although this approach had been tried unsuccessfully by other units before, several important modifications were made to overcome the inherent drawbacks to this design.
The design that was developed consisted of a two-node base, and a chain of node centers 30 km apart placed along the division axis of advance. This allowed the battalion to extend communications over 150 km. This initial daisy chain would be used to support the movement to contact. Once the division reached its objective, the battalion would go back into its normal MSE network configuration.
The division plan was to cross the line of departure in division column, and then approximately 30 km into Iraq, refuel and transition to a wedge formation. In order to place the node centers as far forward as possible so that RAU coverage could be extended forward, the four "daisy chain" nodes moved behind the combat trains of the division advance guard battalion. Every 30 km, a node center would peel off and set up along the axis of advance. Between node centers, a remote RAU was dropped off the axis of advance to improve RAU coverage.
The division command posts were broken into four cells, a Jump DTAC, DTAC, Jump DMAIN, and the DMAIN. The concept was to have an element of DTAC and element of the DMAIN always in the MSE network while the other element moved. The MAIN collocated with a SEN at the node centers while the DTAC was usually tied in through an LOS system to the forward node center. The two 17th Signal Battalion node centers (14 and 15) acted as the network base across the line of departure. All subscriber numbers were loaded into these 2 node centers. This procedure greatly simplified network start-up. A radio relay (LOS V3) placed at each node provided alternate routing and backup if a link went out. Remote RAUs were placed
15 km between node centers to provide Mobile Subscriber Radio Telephone (MSRT) access along the MSR. A local RAU at each node center helped to provide excellent overlapping RAU coverage, A local Small Extension Node (SEN) with Combat Net Radio (CNR) off of the node center provided "phone booth" service for any subscriber to plug into the MSE System. The use of the CNRI greatly extended FM communications.
Since the division would be constantly on the move, providing service to the 200 MSRT users in the division would be given priority. Only the Division Main (2) TAC CP (2), SENs and DISCOM (Large Extension Node) would be linked in while the division was on the move. When the division halted, all SENs would be tied into the network when possible.
All Line-of-Sight V3s (LOS), LOS Vls, and RAUs had their 15 meter masts affixed to the sides of the vans. The idea for this came from SSG Lloyd Graham, the LOS team chief from the 60 Node Center. The masts were secured by 2x4s, rope, and cargo straps. This "quick erect" installation allowed an LOS van to be on the air within 5 minutes. Though the antennas were close together, the battalion experienced very little frequency interference and no antennas fell down even in 60 mph winds.
A standard platoon site layout was developed for the 6 node center platoons. Vehicles were set in standard formation in convoy
, so vehicles could pull off of the axis of advance and set up quickly. This setup was designed to aid in antenna separation in a small area and to also allow subscribers ready access to wireline service.
Each node center was assigned a direct support bulldozer from the 23rd Engineer Battalion to build a defensive berm around the site. The bulldozers proved invaluable in digging in vehicles and fighting positions. A field hospital and maintenance collection point was set up at 4 of the node centers due to their central location along the axis of advance.
Army Communicator Spring 1991