In order to control the rapidly changing network, a split SYSCON was developed. Both SYSCONs had dual FM net capability and a management component. Each SYSCON element would leapfrog so that central control would be maintained. When the Systems Control Center (SCC) was out of system, the alternate SYSCON utilized pre-planned frequencies generated by the SCC if any interference was encountered.
When both SYSCONs were in system, it became readily apparent that 2 separate SYSCONs could not be in control of the network. This was solved by having only one active SYSCON, with the other SYSCON dealing only with subscriber issues. Periodic updates were done between SYSCONs so that a current network status could be maintained at both locations. The active SYSCON was designated by the affiliation of the normal SYSCON numbers. Transfer of control was done by faxing a system worksheet to the standby SYSCON. Once the standby had posted the current network status, the standby SYSCON affiliated the normal SYSCON numbers, and assumed control of the network.
A small SWITCHEX was conducted so that each node center switch would have the division stand-alone 12 preprogrammed conference calls and 40 compressed dial numbers. Each node center was given a list of the 160 MSRTs in the division and 40 non-division MSRT subscribers. This list was utilized to track subscriber movement and insure there was no loss of service. In order not to lose any subscriber numbers, a new duplication SOP was adopted from the 13th Signal Battalion. It was found that numbers could be passed along the chain when more than one node center jumped forward. This was done by verifying duplication, dropping the link, and then doing an Activate Local Duplication (ALD) command for the jumping node center.
In the weeks before the actual attack, the division had two "HUMMEXes" to rehearse the communications plan, and to rehearse the division movement in column, transition to a wedge, and actions on contact. The first rehearsal was conducted with only 2 node centers and 4 remote RAUS. The rest of the division participated down to platoon leader level.
Once the division crossed the LD for HUMMEX 1, the RAUs rapidly became saturated, and many subscribers were unable to even affiliate. The concept for dropping node centers along the axis of advance worked fairly well, but installation time was almost two hours for both node centers. This left the majority of MSRT subscribers out of coverage for considerable periods of time.
In the wake of this first rehearsal, the battalion planners adjusted the concept for "HUMMEX II" to include all 6 node centers and 13 RAUS. With these refinements to the plan, the division launched HUMMEX II. Once again, the division rehearsed the entire movement to contact scenario with node centers moving behind the advance guard battalion, and dropping off along the axis of advance.
Two things the battalion learned from HUMMEX II were that installation times had to get faster and that the RAU coverage had to be improved. To accomplish the first task, the switch operators from Node Center 63 discovered that the switch could be initialized up to Assign Online Diagnostic (AOD) command 91, then the interswitch cables could be disconnected and the switch could move with both vans on DC power. Once the switch arrived on site, the interswitch cables were connected, the final two AOD) commands were performed, and the switch could be operational in 5 minutes or less. To improve RAU coverage, the plans section decided to place remote RAUs at 15 km intervals between node centers. This provided uninterrupted MSRT access as the division moved forward.
With these improvements in place, the battalion had one more chance to practice the war plan prior to the start of the ground war. Seven days before the start of the ground war, the Third Armored Division began movement, from its Tactical Assembly Area to its Forward Assembly Area in a movement that was phased over three days. This was 143rd Signal Battalion's dress rehearsal for war.
On G-7 (start of the ground war minus 7 days), the jump SYSCON moved to Node Center 14 to assume control of the network. Once again, the battalion supported the move from the front, dropping RAUs and node centers along the MSR. In addition, when the division halted, the forward node center established a hasty node site to tie in the forward brigade and Division CPs. Because the movement was phased over three days, the Signal battalion was unable to practice breaking the rear node centers and jumping them forward. In all three rehearsals, that was the one aspect Of the plan which was not rehearsed. Once in the FAA, Node Centers 14 and 15 moved to a holding area.
Having conducted three rehearsals, the battalion was able to refine the war plan to the point where each node center, RAU, and SEN was confident in the concept and execution. This repetition set the stage for success when Operation Desert Storm entered its final phase.
Third Armored Division spent seven days in the forward assembly area prior to the start of the ground war. On the day prior to the beginning of the ground war, NCs 14 and 15 moved forward to locations approximately 25 kilometers south of the Iraq border. The same day, the jump SYSCON moved to NC 14.