At first light on 25 February, Third Armored Division continued the attack with 1st Brigade moving across the berm, followed by DIVARTY, and 3rd Brigade. Node Centers 62 and 63 crossed the berm at 0830 hours and began racing to catch up to Second Brigade.
By 1100 hours, Node Center 61 was on location and had established its first internodal link while the 62 and 63 nodes were passing the lead elements of Second Brigade. At this point, the plan was working better than during any of the rehearsals.
The division CPs were in contact with corps and with each of the brigade CPs, which were moving. Shortly after 1500 hours, Node Center 62 arrived at its location and 40 minutes later, had an internodal link initialized and the local RAU affiliated. Thirty minutes later, the SCC had updated the network status and assumed control of the network. The SCC's first order was to have Node Center 14 break systems and prepare to move.
By 1630 hours, the 63 node had caught up to 2nd Brigade and was moving behind the combat trains of the lead battalion. Less than one hour later, the division had its first contact as the lead company of 4-8 CAV began engaging an Iraqi mechanized company which was dug in 3 km to their front. Due to the contact and the fact that it was getting dark, 63 established a hasty node site approximately 5 miles west of its planned location. Once again the first internodal and local RAU were operational in less than 30 minutes.
At 1830 hours, the 14 node center and SYSCON departed on a 150 jump to the 63 node to establish the next link in the chain. The original plan had been to break the three rear node centers at this point and move them forward to 63 to begin establishing a more doctrinal grid network. However, it had become obvious that the division would not stop at Objective Collins as planned but would transition immediately to a pursuit. In addition, there was no Corps CASC which was in position to provide a gateway to any of the other 3AD node centers. This meant that Node Center 15 would have to remain in place, tied to NC 61 through the relay at 60.
With the lead brigade in contact, and developing the situation, the division commander began to bring the 1st Brigade on line on the right flank. As this was happening, Burse began relaying engineering data to the brigade, DTAC, and DIVARTY SENs were tied in, and the DMAIN was operational at NC 62. The corps commander spent the remainder of the night at the DTAC and made several calls to ARCENT Headquarters in Riyadh, approximately 200 miles to the south.